Ruthenium 106 “leak” explained – l’explication de la “fuite” de Ru106

Kalinovka vu de loin 2

[Français plus bas] Arms depots in Ukraine, because of attacks or simply because of bad storage, have a tendency to detonate.

The CRIIRAD tested samples from Mayak following claims by the IRSN the Ru106 came from there but the samples contained very few Ru106.

The Kalinovka explosion on 26/09/2017 is an obvious source for fission products that have been spread through Europe in the few days afterward (Ru 106 but not only, see here for data on Cs134, Co60, I131…). More data showing a LOT more than Ru106 in the cloud (Ru-103, I-131, Cs-134, Cs-137, Pb-210, Na-22, Be-7 SPIKES). Another article on Cs-137 and I-131 in Estonia in the days following the event.

RU106 MAP florent

IAEA map source

There has been not only a single blast but a series, confirming arms depot stock continuous wave of blasts. Above is one of the most powerful, where we can as always confirm “microfission” i.e. supercriticity in conventional charges thanks to small HEU tips (see ). The flash followed by ascending fireball is obvious.

and another view

Link to video. The main issue for surrounding people is whether the weapons stored in the depot included lots of alpha emitters, alpha-beryllium neutron sources for instance, and depleted uranium. The data on Pb210 suggests Polonium 210 fallout ; Po210 is a typical alpha emitter for neutron sources (with beryllium) in warheads. Pb210 would be used so that it decays slowly into Po210, for a longer usability of the munitions. The explosions lasted for at least a full day (hundreds and hundreds of blasts). 30 000 persons evacuated. Wide area devastated (drone video).

This would be more likely I think if the weapons detonated include lots of recent weapons made from NATO countries (Russia of course uses small levels of nuclear supercriticity in all explosives but no information for instance about birth defects increase in Afghanistan in the 1990s that would confirm addition of depleted uranium). Fission products are of course an issue but far from the radiotoxicity of alpha emitting actinids such as uranium / plutonium (see first acknowledgement of the dangerosity of depleted uranium for human health by the European Commission).

I would recommend to concerned citizens Geiger counter checks (see for instance the Smart Geiger made by Technonia for a first assessment, for more details on the radioisotopes the Rium spectrometer), but for good data on depleted uranium risk, ICP-MS or ICP-AES analysis of a bunch of samples of the ground would be perfect.

It is obvious that the French IRSN is as always LYING as they do not want to expose the fact that conventional weaponry uses small levels of nuclear supercriticity to go through armours. And hence the absence of need to add depleted uranium (link to my website on the topic).

Systematic censorship of close data collectors (except in Belarus, obviously not a NATO member, and we see the increase in the beginning of October) :